Security and tenant isolation are foundational to Callwise. This document outlines the defense-in-depth security model implemented across all four phases of the project.
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| EDGE / INGRESS LAYER |
| - Caddy Reverse Proxy: TLS termination, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff |
| - CORS Regex: Strict origin filtering for dashboard and public widgets |
| - Global Emergency Kill Switch: Dynamic shutdown with fallback message-taking |
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| AUTHENTICATION & SESSIONS |
| - Passwords: Argon2id hashing with per-user salt |
| - Sessions: Cryptographic 64-character tokens, stored as SHA-256 in DB |
| - Cookies: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure flags |
| - Double-Submit CSRF: Cryptographically validated per mutating state request |
| - Rate Limiting: 5 failed login attempts -> 15-minute progressive IP lockout |
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| MULTI-TENANT ISOLATION LAYER |
| - PostgreSQL Row Level Security (RLS) on all tenant tables |
| - SET LOCAL app.current_business_id per database transaction |
| - Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Owner, Manager, Staff |
| - Automated CI endpoint isolation scanning across all OpenAPI routes |
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| AI & AGENT SAFETY GUARDRAILS |
| - Hallucination Prevention: Below similarity cutoff -> declines speculation |
| - Prompt Injection Defense: Sanitization and strict system boundary fences |
| - SSRF Protection: Private IP and loopback blocking for knowledge scraping |
| - PII Redaction Filter: Credit cards, SSNs, and API keys scrubbed from logs |
| - Provider Circuit Breakers: Automatic failover on upstream failure |
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| Threat | Risk Level | Mitigation in Callwise |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-Tenant Data Leakage | Critical | PostgreSQL Row Level Security (RLS) enforces tenant boundaries at the database kernel level. Every request sets app.current_business_id. |
| Credential Stuffing & Brute Force | High | In-memory IP-based rate limiting enforces a 15-minute lockout after 5 consecutive failed attempts on /api/auth/login. |
| Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) | High | Double-submit CSRF cookie pattern (cw_csrf_token cookie compared against X-CSRF-Token header using constant-time string comparison). |
| Prompt Injection via Caller Input | High | User turns are stripped of formatting exploits, enclosed within explicit quotation fences, and guided by system prompt instructions to prioritize tools over user claims. |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | High | Web knowledge scraper parses all URLs, resolves DNS, and strictly blocks private, loopback (127.0.0.0/8), Link-Local (169.254.0.0/16), and RFC-1918 addresses (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16). |
| Unauthorized Booking Modification | High | 6-character booking codes are stored as SHA-256 hashes. Rescheduling or cancelling requires caller verification against customer name and phone number with a 3-strike lockout. |
| PII & Secret Leaks in Server Logs | Medium | Custom RedactionFilter scrubs credit card numbers, Social Security Numbers, Bearer tokens, and passwords before formatting into JSON or text log streams. |
| Telephony Flooding & Abuse | Medium | Per-caller rate limiting restricts phone callers to 5 calls per hour. Nonsense and keyboard smash detectors flag abusive callers, block further turns, and alert the owner via email. |
| Container Privilege Escalation | Medium | Docker containers run under unprivileged, non-root users (callwise:1001 in Python backend, nextjs:1001 in web dashboard). |
- Every database table has a non-nullable
business_idforeign key. - PostgreSQL Row Level Security (RLS) policies are active and enforced.
- Automated test
test_openapi_automated_endpoint_isolation_scanruns in CI, iterating over all endpoints to guarantee unauthenticated requests return 401 and cross-tenant requests return 403 or 404.
- Passwords are encrypted using Argon2id (
argon2-cffi). - Passwords require at least 8 characters.
- Sessions are stored in the
sessionstable using SHA-256 hashed tokens. - Cookies use
HttpOnlyandSameSite=Lax.
- Security headers middleware injects
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,X-XSS-Protection, andReferrer-Policy. - Public widget endpoints allow iframe embedding (
X-Frame-Optionsomitted); administrative dashboard enforcesX-Frame-Options: DENY. - CORS middleware uses regex checking to allow valid local development ports while rejecting arbitrary external origins.
- Emergency kill switch can be toggled via environment variable or instant CLI command (
callwise killswitch enable). - Provider circuit breakers track failures and automatically route requests to fallback models when upstream providers fail.
- Database backups are encrypted/compressed (
.sql.gz) with restricted file permissions.