AsyncHttpClient stores cookie for an unrelated domain (cookie tossing) via ThreadSafeCookieStore
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jun 15, 2026
in
AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client
•
Updated Aug 26, 2026
Package
Affected versions
>= 3.0.0.Beta1, < 3.0.11
>= 2.0.0, < 2.16.0
Patched versions
3.0.11
2.16.0
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jul 1, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Aug 26, 2026
Reviewed
Aug 26, 2026
Last updated
Aug 26, 2026
Impact
A cookie tossing / cookie injection issue (CWE-1275).
ThreadSafeCookieStorestored a cookie under the value of itsDomainattribute without verifying that the responding host is allowed to set a cookie for that domain (RFC 6265 §5.3 step 6). A host the client connects to can therefore plant a cookie scoped to an unrelated domain, and the client will then send that cookie on later requests to that domain.Who is Impacted
Applications that use a single
AsyncHttpClientinstance - and thus the default, sharedCookieStore- to reach both an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host. Typical exposure: crawlers, link-preview / webhook fetchers, SSRF-style "fetch this URL" features, multi-backend aggregators, or following redirects to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker can write a cookie the client presents to the victim host (session fixation, overwriting a session id / CSRF-token cookie); they cannot read the victim host's cookies. Applications that talk only to a fixed trusted backend, or that disable/scope the cookie store, are not exposed.Patches
Fixed in 3.0.11 and 2.16.0
Workarounds
References