Repository navigation
Conversation
b7r6
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 2, 2026
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
b7r6
force-pushed
the
main
branch
2 times, most recently
from
October 4, 2026 22:41
83c1f81 to
a9c6801
Compare
b7r6
force-pushed
the
fix/redis-read-integrity-v2
branch
4 times, most recently
from
October 8, 2026 17:51
3245901 to
44daaf1
Compare
b7r6
force-pushed
the
fix/redis-read-integrity-v2
branch
2 times, most recently
from
October 15, 2026 11:19
38d5bc9 to
a754819
Compare
Completes the no-per-PR-OCI-builds intent: image-off-pr moved image.yaml off PRs and TraceMachina#2877 moved the nix integration job off PRs, but main.yaml's integration-tests (docker-compose image build + run_integration_tests.sh) fell between them and still ran on every PR. Defer to nightly + merge-to-main, matching TraceMachina#2880's pattern. Fork-local until folded into the upstream OCI/nightly set.
… residual) PR TraceMachina#2841 added length + existence guards to the chunked Redis read path. Astra's C10 audit flagged that length checking cannot establish stable value identity: if a key's value is replaced by a *different* value of the same total length between chunk reads, the reader stitches bytes from two values and serves a torn blob as success. STRLEN is identical the whole way through, so no length-based guard can catch it. This confirms the hole is reachable and ships a reproduction, rather than a shallow length patch that would not close it. `get_part` reads a value larger than `read_chunk_size` with one `GETRANGE` per chunk, each a separate round-trip; values are mutable (`update` writes a temp key then `RENAME`s it onto the final key, discarding whatever was there). Content addressing makes this a non-issue for CAS, but the AC / scheduler / arbitrary-key uses of this same driver mutate values legitimately, so an equal-length replacement interleaved between two chunk reads tears the result. The new test drives exactly that interleaving through the mock connection and asserts the current code returns head-of-A spliced onto tail-of-B as Ok. Why no point fix here: closing equal-length replacement requires a snapshot-consistent read across more than one round-trip. On plain Redis strings that is only achievable by (a) reading the whole range in one atomic command (EVAL / MULTI), which materializes the entire value in a single reply and is unbounded for large blobs, or (b) attaching a version/identity to the value that `update` writes and `get_part` checks across chunks -- a change to the write path and the key/value schema. Both change the store read/write contract broadly, so the complete fix is RFC-track rather than a local patch. The single-chunk read path is already atomic and unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
b7r6
force-pushed
the
fix/redis-read-integrity-v2
branch
from
October 21, 2026 17:35
a754819 to
5c5d804
Compare
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
What and why
Lane A stability fix from the findings catalog (see
nativelink-findings-2026-10-05.csvon the
meta/findings-catalog-2026-10-05branch), rebased onto OSS main@bf4b3aa855. This fork PR exists to validate the change on CI that is
representative of upstream PR lanes (public read-only cache, same endpoints)
before any upstream submission.
How was this verified?
The branch carries its own regression tests (fails-without where the fix
class allows it — see the branch's test commits). This PR's purpose is the
full representative CI run; green here rehearses the exact checks an
upstream PR would face.
Risk
Fork-internal validation PR; nothing lands anywhere by merging this. The
underlying fix's risk assessment happens at upstream-submission time.
AI assistance
Agent-assisted pipeline (Claude) for rebase and PR mechanics under my
direction; the fix itself carries verification in its tests.